The JNU Free Speech Controversy-1

The controversy over JNU and free speech leaves me somewhat bemused.  The hypocrisy on all sides of the debate is truly astounding.  What is common to all sides is that their idea of "free" speech is not so about any principles but about "convenient" speech.  For all sides in this debate, the only "free" speech they recognize is their own right to speak, the only speech they will defend is speech they agree with and all sides will oppose any "free" speech that disagrees with their orthodoxies.  A good example is a recent essay by two of my colleagues that I have responded to in a companion post, immediately following this post.  [I wanted to include it here but as it was getting a bit long, I split it into two posts]. Read these posts together. 

As for the political parties, the less said the better.  BJP leaders haven't exactly covered themselves in glory with their ill-advised statements and actions.  The BJP is today the only politically relevant centre-right political voice in the country and this episode once again demonstrates the crying need for a center-right alternative to the BJP that will be based on libertarian principles of limited government and freedom rather than the religion-based conservatism that the BJP represents.

And then we have the Congress, which has spent the better part of its several decades of rule banning anything that any section of the population had any objection to, now suddenly masquerading as a defender of free speech!  As for the Left parties, that they can even mouth "free speech" without bursting into flames is a wonder.  It would all be comical if it weren't so tragic. 

The JNU Free Speech Controversy-2

This is a continuation of my previous post about free speech in JNU.  As I mentioned there, Happymon Jacob and A.K. Ramakrishnan, both colleagues at the School of International Studies, JNU, wrote recently in the India Express about threats to free speech in Indian universities.  They argued that what was happening to JNU was part of a pattern and that the very idea of the university was under attack.  This was rich, I thought, considering that the Left has hardly a great record as defenders of free speech.  I wrote a response to their essay and send it to the Indian Express immediately but since Indian Express has not published it, I am posting it here in full. 

JNU and the Myth of Academic Freedom

Two of my esteemed colleagues from JNU argued in these pages a few days back (Happymon Jacob and AK Ramakrishnan, “There’s A Cop in My Class”, February 27, 2016) that the very idea of the university is under threat from the BJP government, that the attack on JNU is part of larger attack on “academic spaces and intellectual freedom”.  I hold no brief for the BJP government, and I fully support the right to free speech, especially when it is speech with which I disagree (such as some of slogans that were shouted in JNU on February 9). 

Change Pak army terror calculus by supporting domestic rebels in Pakistan

The terrorist attack on the Pathankot Indian Air Force base once again highlights the problematic nature of India's 'talk-no talk' strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan.  I had written about this earlier too, in 2008 in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attack, and in August 2015, in the aftermath of the Gurdsapur attack and pressure on the Indian government to cancel NSA (National Security Advisor)-level talks. My views on the subject have remained fairly consistent: to respond to Pakistan's transgressions, India needs alternatives to simply calling off talks.  Calling off talks is usually a foolish gesture.  India needs to develop military and covert measures to deter and punish the Pakistan army's use of terror against India. 

Though I argue that India should not discontinue talks, I also argue that continuing talks without responding to terrorist attacks and other outrages by the Pakistan army is equally foolish -- and unsustainable.  Since this essay was published a few days back, other analysts, who are far more knowledgeable about Pakistan, have pointed out that much of the supposed 'action' that Pakistan is taking against the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorists is the usual drama they have engaged in many times before, without any real effort at curbing these terrorist organizations, in essence a farce to placate foreign leaders.  This is eminently understandable because the Pakistan army feels no pressure to take any real action, and as I point out in the essay, it is a high-benefit, low-cost and low-risk strategy.  If, as seems likely, the talks were to continue, we should expect more attacks, unless India can develop options to change the Pakistan army's calculus.  My essay, published by the Observer Research Foundation, is reproduced below.


Suspending talks is surrendering to Pak Army strategy

In the aftermath of the terror attack in Pathankot, the pressure on Prime Minister Narendra Modi to suspend dialogue with Pakistan is mounting.  Even if he resists the pressure this time, the India-Pakistan dialogue will constantly be at risk because the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) can sponsor more terror attacks until it becomes politically impossible for the Modi government to continue the dialogue.  As long as India’s only response to terror attacks is to suspend talks, the Pakistan Army will hold the upper hand.  Suspension of talks does not impose any cost on the Pakistan army; indeed, it is what they seek.  India needs to develop alternate counter-measures so that it has options other than suspension of talks.  Indian decision-makers need to understand the Pakistan army’s support for terrorism as a rational and usually effective strategy if India is to develop such counter-measures that increase the costs and reduce the benefits to the Pakistan army in using terror as a strategy.

The Structural Consequences of China's Rise

I wrote an essay on "The Structural Consequences of China's Rise" for a conference on "the US Rebalance and the Asia-Pacific Region", organized by the Centre for Public Policy Research, Kochi. The papers have now been put together by CPPR and is available as a book. My essay, more a brief and slightly abstract think-piece, is pasted below.  

 

I have tried to explore the impact of China's rise from a Structural Realist perspective.  One of my concerns with Structural Realism is its focus on just great power politics.  Though Kenneth Waltz and other have their justification for such a focus (that great powers are more consequential) I think it is time that Structural Realists, and other Realists, started focusing more on regional politics. This is one among a few of my early explorations of how this might be done, so comments are very welcome.   

 

 

The Structural Consequences of China's Rise

Rajesh Rajagopalan

China's rise, over the medium term, can lead to three possible structural consequences,

depending on different permutations of Chinese and US economic growth rates. These are (in random

order) a continuation of the current unipolar order; a bipolar system with China joining the United

States (US) as a polar power; and a multipolar system in which China and one or more powers join the

US as polar powers. Over the long term, there are other possibilities such as a non-polar order or a

unipolar system with China as the unipole, but these are not considered here.

India's Unrealized Power

This is being posted a bit late but . . .

I wrote the India chapter in the NBR's (National Bureau of Asian Research) latest annual edition of Strategic Asia.  The volume titled Foundations of National Power in Asia, was edited by Ashley Tellis, Alison Szalwinski and Michael Wills.  It involved trying to measure national power through a complex set of quantitative and qualitatives indices that Ashley Tellis et al has originally proposed in a RAND study in the 1990s.  In my chapter "India's Unrealized Power", I argued that though India was growing richer and more capable, its relative power vis-à-vis some key players such as China has actually gotten worse.  India, I argued, is being held back primarily because of the inefficiency of its state structure and particularly its bureaucracy.  I am somewhat pessimistic about India's future prospects, though I would expect that India would continue to grow at a reasonable pace.  But India has been extremely inefficient in converting its various resources -- natural and human -- into military power. 

The volume was released on November 18. Though I could not be there for the launch the audio and video of the launch is available at the NBR site.

Did Rajiv Gandhi Really Plan to Go to War with Pakistan to Save the Najibullah regime?

Maybe. 

This is one of the several little nuggets I found in an essay on Soviet-Indian relations in the last decade of the Cold War.  It was published as a chapter in 2011 by Sergey Radchenko in a book he co-edited with Artemy M. Kalinovsky, The End of the Cold War and the Third World:New Perspectives on Regional Conflict based on declassified East bloc archives.  [I had not seen this earlier; it was bought to my attention by Yogesh Joshi, one of my PhD students]. I have little doubt that the documentary evidence Radchenko presents is credible, even if I might quibble with some interpretations.  The broad argument that Radchenko makes is that both Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi were somewhat naïve not only about international politics but also about Soviet-Indian relations.  It also shows both sides maneuvering around each other in a manner that reveals somewhat greater crudity (in the best Realist sense of the word!) than I would have imagined.  But it also reveals a lot of other things, including India’s unhealthy obsession with Pakistan and – despite Indira Gandhi’s and Rajiv Gandhi’s successful state visits to the US and generally improving US-India ties – deep and abiding Indian suspicions about the US. 

Now to the juicy bits:

Talking and Fighting with Pakistan

As India and Pakistan squabble over the NSA Talks, I argue that India needs to develop military options to respond to Pakistan's support of terrorism and other transgressions, without letting fear of nuclear escalation paralyze it. The essay was originally carried by the Observer Research Foundation website. There is considerable pressure from opposition parties and others on Prime Minister Narendra Modi to suspend the forthcoming National Security Advisor (NSA) level talks between India and Pakistan. This once again raises the dilemma that has faced several Indian government about how to talk with Pakistan even as Pakistan sponsors terrorism against India. India can avoid this dilemma if it develops military options to respond to Pakistan's transgressions, both to deter future attacks and also so that Indian decision-makers have options not limited to simply calling off talks each time Pakistan engages in such behaviour.  Though Pakistan's cross-border firing, its continued sponsorship of terrorism in India and its insistence on talking to the Hurriyat (despite the Indian government making it a 'red line') have made life difficult for the Modi government, the government should resist the pressure to call off the talks. Calling off talks is a pointless and short-term measure which will have to be eventually revised. It is an indication of the bankruptcy of India's policy planning process and an admission of helplessness. These talks are unlikely to lead to any fruitful results, especially in the short-term, but it should be Pakistan that calls off the talks, not India. Calling of talks is not sufficient to deter Pakistan's support for terrorism. Instead, while always remaining open to talks with Pakistan at any time on any subject, India should develop options to respond with force to Pakistan's own use of force.

The Aam Admi Party and Indian Politics: Winners and Losers

I had written a brief analysis of what the rise of the Aam Admi Party (AAP) means for Indian politics for the Rising Powers blog.  I forgot to post it, and though its been almost a month, I thought I'd post it.

The Aam Admi Party and Indian Politics: Winners and Losers

The Aam Aadmi Party’s (AAP) spectacular victory in the New Delhi state elections is a continuation of the churning in Indian politics. It presents a warning for both the main national political parties but particularly to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which won equally spectacularly in the national elections last summer and in a series of state elections subsequently. The AAP’s prospects beyond New Delhi are still unclear and its path is likely to be difficult, especially because this will depend at least partly on its performance in Delhi. The AAP represents both the future and the past of Indian politics: it is responding to a politically weak but growing and restive middle class that has not yet found a political party home, while its ideology, especially on economic policy, represents a failed past.

The AAPs victory is not record-setting in the Indian political context, but it is close: its 67/70 seats result has been bested only twice, both times in Sikkim. In 1989, the Sikkim Sangram Party won all 32 seats in the Sikkim state legislature, a feat repeated twenty years later in 2009 by the Sikkim Democratic Front. But nonetheless, considering the importance of New Delhi, the fierceness of the campaign in which Prime Minister Modi himself took part, and the BJP’s performance in the recent national elections (when it won all seven seats from Delhi), the result was a clear defeat for the BJP.

Review of Basrur's India's Military Modernization

The latest edition of The Book Review is out and I reviewed Rajesh Basrur's latest book, which he co-edited with Ajaya Kumar Das and Manjeet S. Pardesi, on India's military modernization.

Civil-Military Disconnect

Rajesh Rajagopalan

INDIA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

Edited by Rajesh Basrur, Ajaya Kumar Das and Manjeet S. Pardesi

Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2014, pp. 311, R950.00

India has one of the world’s largest military forces and it is also among the largest military spenders in the world, both in terms of military expenditure and arms imports. Nevertheless, the Indian military faces huge challenges. This is partly the function of the variegated nature of these challenges,

fighting in theatres as diverse as the Himalayas, the deserts of Rajasthan and the jungles in Chhattisgarh for the ground forces and equally diverse ones for the other two services. But

India’s political and administrative systems are also to blame for a confused and confusing approach to every aspect of security policy, from nuclear weapons to counterinsurgency and defence research

and production. These problems become even more acute when the current phase of military modernization is taken into account. The growth of the Indian military, a natural consequence of a larger economic pie (the proportion of wealth devoted to the military has remained low and steady), brings these issues into sharp focus. This volume, edited by Rajesh Basrur, Ajaya Kumar Das and Manjeet Pardesi, brings together both scholars and retired military leaders to present a comprehensive picture of the challenges that Indian military modernization faces. The story is one that is almost uniformly depressing.