Wednesday, June 26, 2013
NTRO's troubles
In my essay in The Economic Times on the Snowden affair, I had mentioned briefly, off-tangent really, about the disputes between the National Technical Resources Organization and other Indian intelligence agencies over control of various technical assets and equipment. Now comes an Op-Ed in the Indian Express about the politics and other troubles in the NTRO told from the perspective of an insider to the Indian intelligence world. Interesting stuff, especially because politics in Indian intelligence bureaucracy seems not very different from politics in other Indian bureaucracies.
Tuesday, June 25, 2013
Snowden's Run
Edward Snowden continues to run from US authorities, and is now presumably cooling his heels at the transit lounge of Sheremetyevo airport in Moscow. His flight path, according to news reports, takes him from China-controlled Hong Kong to Moscow and then towards Cuba and finally either Ecuador or Venezuela. I am not sure why North Korea was off this list since it seems to match all of the key requirement that Snowden and his Wikileaks supporters seem to want: unlimited personal freedom, fast internet and limited government.
My take on the Snowden affair was published by Economic Times last week. Took me some time to put it up . . . .
My take on the Snowden affair was published by Economic Times last week. Took me some time to put it up . . . .
Rouhani's views on nuclear negotiations, c. 2005
Hassan Rouhani, newly elected President of Iran, is no stranger to nuclear negotiations as he was Iran's chief nuclear negotiator for a couple of years (2003-2005). He also made a speech during this time, which has been public for some time but has obviously gained a lot of attention after he won the election. It was an internal speech, which gives it considerable credibility, made while he was chief negotiator and sets out Iran's negotiating strategy. It is now almost a decade later, but it still provides an interesting view into Rouhani's thinking. The excellent analysis is provided by Dr. Chen Kane of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The essay is worth reading in full.
Monday, June 24, 2013
On the Iranian elections
There has been a good deal of commentary on the recent Iran elections. My take, published in The Economic Times on June 12, is that this election will not be consequential irrespective of who wins. The piece was published before the elections but though Hassan Rouhani -- the most moderate and prudent candidate in this limited field -- won convincingly, I would still stand by my original analysis. Indeed, he might be even more of a challenge than Ahmadinejad both because he is and perceived as more moderate (but who is unlikely to give up Iran's nuclear weapons program) and because he is quite crafty. Dr. Raja Mohan has a somewhat similar take in the Indian Express, obviously presented much better.
The inconsequential election of Iran could only spell further doom
By Rajesh Rajagopalan
The results of the Iranian presidential elections this Friday should be important because Iran is central to the stability in the region. Unfortunately, the heavily controlled election, in which religious leaders have barred any candidate who would present an alternative path, means that irrespective of who wins, there is unlikely to be a major change in Iran's policies.
The inconsequential election of Iran could only spell further doom
By Rajesh Rajagopalan
The results of the Iranian presidential elections this Friday should be important because Iran is central to the stability in the region. Unfortunately, the heavily controlled election, in which religious leaders have barred any candidate who would present an alternative path, means that irrespective of who wins, there is unlikely to be a major change in Iran's policies.
Sunday, June 23, 2013
Of Superheroes and Synopses
Posting below Kasturi Moitra's unusual take on Man of Steel. I have not seen the movie myself but this is a good reason to see it.
Of Superheroes and Synopses
KASTURI MOITRA
After
watching the latest Superman movie — Man
of Steel — I couldn’t help wondering how alarmingly akin the making of a
superhero flick is to the writing of a PhD synopsis. Few reasons as to why I
didn’t think Man of Steel was a good
superhero film were: 1) The Superman wasn’t handsome enough 2) The villain in
Superman was not formidable enough 3) The set-up was too fantastical (aliens!)
4) There was nothing new in the film. I realized to my horror that often our
PhD synopses get rejected for the very same reasons! Behold.
Saturday, June 1, 2013
The Maoist Threat
A nice essay by Shekar Gupta in the Indian Express today about the India government's response to the Maoists attack on a group of campaigning Congress leaders in Chattisgarh. As he correctly points out, not even the ruling party -- let alone the ruling coalition -- is united about how to fight the Maoists and indeed, apparently whether they should be fought at all. Though many of the worthies in the Congress, including Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde and even Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh attacked the Maoists and characterized them correctly as terrorists, others such K.C. Deo and Digvijaya Singh were true to form, making partisan attacks and looking for what Gupta calls 'root cause' theories.
Another indicator of the difference within the government is the viewpoint of the semi-government, leftist-National Advisory Council (NAC) which is supposed "to provide inputs in the formulation of policy by the government." The NAC includes people who criticize the government for fighting the Maoists and are great exponents of the root cause theory. Even when NAC members themselves are targeted, with Maoists letters openly threatening some of them, the first response from some of their sympathizers is that it must be either a mistake or because the Maoists have no control over their cadres.
The point is that the Maoists have only one, and rather Quixotic aim: overthrowing the Indian state. And there is only one solution to deal with them: militarily defeat and eliminate the hardcore so that the rest can be brought into the political mainstream. This does not mean that there are no social or economic issues with regard to poor governance or the general condition of tribals and other disadvantaged groups in India's hinterlands. The condition in which such disadvantaged Indians live, six decades after India's independence, should be a source of abiding shame. But for the Maoists, they represent nothing more than an opportunity and an excuse. The Maoists represent as much of a solution to the problems facing various rural communities as their cousins the Khmer Rouge did in Cambodia. But given the nature of centre-state relations which prevents proper coordination between different agencies and the poor quality of various paramiltary and special police forces (with exceptions such the AP Police Greyhounds), I expect that the situation will get a lot worse before it gets better.
Another indicator of the difference within the government is the viewpoint of the semi-government, leftist-National Advisory Council (NAC) which is supposed "to provide inputs in the formulation of policy by the government." The NAC includes people who criticize the government for fighting the Maoists and are great exponents of the root cause theory. Even when NAC members themselves are targeted, with Maoists letters openly threatening some of them, the first response from some of their sympathizers is that it must be either a mistake or because the Maoists have no control over their cadres.
The point is that the Maoists have only one, and rather Quixotic aim: overthrowing the Indian state. And there is only one solution to deal with them: militarily defeat and eliminate the hardcore so that the rest can be brought into the political mainstream. This does not mean that there are no social or economic issues with regard to poor governance or the general condition of tribals and other disadvantaged groups in India's hinterlands. The condition in which such disadvantaged Indians live, six decades after India's independence, should be a source of abiding shame. But for the Maoists, they represent nothing more than an opportunity and an excuse. The Maoists represent as much of a solution to the problems facing various rural communities as their cousins the Khmer Rouge did in Cambodia. But given the nature of centre-state relations which prevents proper coordination between different agencies and the poor quality of various paramiltary and special police forces (with exceptions such the AP Police Greyhounds), I expect that the situation will get a lot worse before it gets better.
Saturday, May 25, 2013
Discussing Nuke Disarmament at Glion
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GSCP) invited a small group to discuss nuke disarmament at Glion, a small village about a hundred kilometers outside of Geneva (on Lake Geneva), Switzerland.
The discussions were under the Chatham House rule but I can report that it was a fairly useful and innovative approach, with a focus on how security might be maintained after nuclear disarmament. We discussed some of the challenges, potential institutional and other other response measures and the prospects for stability. My feeling was that the
insecurity of the weaker members of the current nuclear weapons club (and some of the potential members such as Iran) needed to be taken seriously, may be even more seriously than the concerns of the great powers. I suspect that even if the major nuclear powers agree to give up nuclear weapons (!!), the smaller ones might be more reluctant because they (countries like Israel, Pakistan, North Korea etc.) pursued nuclear weapons to overcome significant disadvantages in conventional military power. Unless there are drastic reductions in conventional military imbalances (if then), it is unlikely that these weaker nuclear weapon powers will give up their nukes. But it was a good exercise in imagination what might happen in one possible future, at a breathtaking venue. And the thirty degree Celsius temperature difference with Delhi didn't hurt either!
The discussions were under the Chatham House rule but I can report that it was a fairly useful and innovative approach, with a focus on how security might be maintained after nuclear disarmament. We discussed some of the challenges, potential institutional and other other response measures and the prospects for stability. My feeling was that the
insecurity of the weaker members of the current nuclear weapons club (and some of the potential members such as Iran) needed to be taken seriously, may be even more seriously than the concerns of the great powers. I suspect that even if the major nuclear powers agree to give up nuclear weapons (!!), the smaller ones might be more reluctant because they (countries like Israel, Pakistan, North Korea etc.) pursued nuclear weapons to overcome significant disadvantages in conventional military power. Unless there are drastic reductions in conventional military imbalances (if then), it is unlikely that these weaker nuclear weapon powers will give up their nukes. But it was a good exercise in imagination what might happen in one possible future, at a breathtaking venue. And the thirty degree Celsius temperature difference with Delhi didn't hurt either!
On Premier Li's visit
Here's my take on the Premier Li's visit, published a few days back in the Economic Times:
India need not sacrifice balancing China at the altar of better relations
Despite the border intrusion, China has been making the right noises about improving relations with India. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang will echo that theme during his visit to India this week. But New Delhi needs to look beyond the rhetoric and make hardheaded assessments about its relations with China.
This does not mean that India should not be open to Chinese efforts to improve relations or resolve the border dispute. What it does mean is that India should look to Chinese actions rather than its words.
India need not sacrifice balancing China at the altar of better relations
This does not mean that India should not be open to Chinese efforts to improve relations or resolve the border dispute. What it does mean is that India should look to Chinese actions rather than its words.
Monday, May 20, 2013
Views on the Li visit . . . .
Lots of comment of Chinese Premier Li's visit to India. Here are just a few . . .
- Premier Li Keqiang wants India and China "to work hand in hand"
- Raja Mohan asks for greater realism in Indian policy
- Kasturi Moitra (full disclosure: one of my grad students) on what India needs to learn from China in terms of statecraft
- Hardeep Puri on playing hardball with China
- DNA (Mumbai) on building bridges with neighbours
I will shortly post my own take . . .
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