More Flux in South Asian Alignments

In July, I had written an essay in Economic Times arguing that closer Sino-Russian relations could spell trouble for India down the road.  As relations between the West and Russia tumble further, we can expect Moscow and Beijing to get closer.  This could have potential blowback on Russian-Indian relations.  Before his trip to US, Prime Minister Modi strongly defended Russia.  When he was asked by Fareed Zakaria about Russian annexation of Crimea, he replied in part:

"There's a saying in India that the person who should throw a stone first is the person who has not committed any sins.  In the world right now, a lot of people want to give advice, but look within them, and they, too, have sinned in some way.

Ultimately India's viewpoint is that efforts need to be made to sit together and talk and to resolve problems in an ongoing process."

Such support is understandable given India's long strategic association with Russia/Soviet Union. But this might become increasingly untenable, and New Delhi needs to be careful about how Russia's increasing closeness to China affects Indian interests.  India needs Russian support in a variety of international bodies, on a number of issues, from NSG membership to dealing with a post-American Afghanistan.  And of course, the Indian military is mostly still dependent on Russian arms. The question is whether Moscow's support to India on these issues will now weaken somewhat.

Now comes news that Russia and Pakistan are seeking somewhat closer military ties, news that has been largely ignored in the Indian media. The last time such ties developed was in the late 1960s, when the Soviet Union attempted a brief neutrality between the two countries in order to promote a South Asian settlement, hoping that a less divided subcontinent under Moscow's protection might help it against both Beijing and Washington.  That move went nowhere fast, annoying India without getting much out of Pakistan.  Maybe it will be no different this time either, but it bears watching.  President Putin will be in Delhi next month and it should give India some idea about Russian attitudes.  Of course, the fact that Modi has just invited Obama to be the Republic Day guest is not likely to go down well in Moscow. All in all, a period of greater flux and uncertainty in regional alignments.

After Modi's US Visit

My assessment about the state of the US-India relationship has been put out by the East West Centre through its Asia-Pacific Bulletin series.  I argued that while there are some significant advances, the relationship also faces some problems, especially as a consequence of Obama's disinterest in the region, India repeatedly disappointing its friends in Washington, and New Delhi's continuing foolishness over the nuclear liability bill.  The essay is reproduced below.

US-India Relations after the Modi Visit

A decade back, US-India relations appeared finally to be ready to break from the traditional pattern of swinging between euphoria and exasperation.  But over the last several years, that pattern re-emerged as both Washington and New Delhi busily dug their relationship into a hole.  One state visit, even such a high-octane one as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s, cannot be expected to pull the two sides out of this hole, but it would be fair to say that the two sides have at least stopped digging.  But there is hard work ahead and the outcome is by no means certain. 

There is enough blame to go around for the state of the relationship, though New Delhi has to take a bigger share.  Immediately after the US-India nuclear deal was concluded, the UPA government under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was in a hurry to distance itself from the US, frightened about the domestic political consequence of its closeness to Washington.  What followed was India’s Nuclear Liability Bill (which essentially negated the key benefits of the US-India nuclear deal), its decision to reject American combat jets for the Indian Air Force, its abstention from the Libya vote in the UN Security Council, and a downgrading of military ties.  On the US side, President Obama started out as other Democratic presidents have, wanting a special relationship with China and seeking to push a Kashmir negotiation between India and Pakistan, both key red flags for India.  More fundamentally, Obama’s apparent desire to pull back from America’s global commitments led to concerns in Asia and in India about Washington’s dependability just as China was asserting itself in Asia – concerns that have yet to subside despite Obama’s Asia ‘pivot’ and ‘rebalancing’. 

Rhetoric, Capability and Credibility in Indian Strategic Policy

Prime Minister Narendra Modi definitely has a lot of advantages over Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, especially when it comes to foreign and security policies.  Unlike Singh, he doesn't have to constantly look over his shoulder to make sure his party leaders are supporting him (remember the nuclear deal?).  Equally importantly, within the government, Singh was constantly second-guessed by other Congress big-wigs who appear never to have forgiven him for taking the top spot.  In addition, Modi comes from a very different background, from outside the New Delhi IIC culture, and appears less concerned about mouthing empty left-liberal slogans about peace and disarmament.  All this might explain why he has been much more willing to unshackle the security forces on both the Pakistan front and the China front.  Moreover, can anyone imagine Singh talking about 'vistaarvad', especially while on a trip to Japan?  [And for those who think that this was a one off, or that he wasn't referring to China, Modi had used the same word during the election campaign, while in Arunachal Pradesh, and it was a direct reference to China].

Having said all this though, there is also a danger about rhetoric running ahead of actual military capabilities.  Credibility is important in international politics and it is better to bide your time while building up your capabilities rather than let your mouth back you into a corner.  So, while Modi's firmness is welcome, I worry that New Delhi hasn't prepared for what might happen if there is an escalation.  This is particularly worrisome with regard to China, but also a problem with Pakistan. My essay in the Economic Times outlines these concerns, and is reproduced below.

Indo-Pak border skirmish: India needs to be firm & careful in its response

India's unusually tough response to Pakistan's border infractions appear to have silenced Islamabad. At least for now. Much to its own detriment, India has rarely considered military force as an element in its strategic tool kit. If India's response now signals a change in how it combines diplomacy and force, it can only be welcomed. But the harsh political rhetoric that accompanied this apparent change in strategy has its own pitfalls that New Delhi needs to consider with care. US President Theodore Roosevelt is credited with the aphorism 'Speak softly and carry a big stick'. This reflects a happy synergy between political rhetoric and practical capacities, but one that is rarely forged in foreign policies. India's leaders have been particularly inept in understanding this relationship.

New Book

I and Atul Mishra are proud to announce that our book Nuclear South Asia: Keywords and Concepts has now been published by Routledge.  This was several years in the works and at one point, I had even given up on completing it, until Atul came on board to rescue it.  The project started as a dictionary series, which I agreed to join with considerable reluctance and with good reason: a project like this requires great discipline and I wasn't sure I was up to it.  After some initial work, I realized that my original doubts were well founded: I would not be able to do this on my own and I was ready to junk it.  That was when Atul agreed to join the project and breathed fresh life into it.  This was a huge burden for Atul because he was still writing his PhD thesis and this was a subject way beyond his PhD thesis topic. Nevertheless he not only agreed to join but gave me sufficient hope that I could get back to working on it.  Once we were finished with our initial draft came the next obstacle: because most of the other authors contracted to write dictionaries on other topics in the same series failed to finish their manuscripts, the entire series was shelved by the publisher.  We understood the publisher's point of view -- you cannot have a series with just one manuscript, after all -- but this left us with a more or less complete manuscript and no publisher.  We had some interest from at least one other publisher, but they required significant additions and both I and Atul were too exhausted to consider it.  Eventually, after more than a year of sitting on the shelf, Routledge finally expressed an interest but because a couple of years had passed since we wrote the manuscript, it required significant updating.  After this long journey, I think it would be fair to say that both of us are at least as much relieved as excited that it is now out.

Handling Great Power Relations

The Asian security situation is slowly deteriorating, the consequence of both China's rise as well Washington's seeming fickleness that is sending its allies such as Japan looking for new allies in the region.  But its not just Japan that is feeling the effect of insecurity: Vietnam (where Indian President just completed a state visit) and Australia (whose Prime Minister Tony Abbot also was in Delhi recently) are also worried, as are others which have territorial disputes with China, such as the Philippines.  But China is taking efforts to prevent these Asian powers from coming together, primarily focusing on India and Australia.  That is smart and prudent strategy.  President Xi visit to India this week has to be seen in this light.

But from India's perspective, it has to be clear-eyed about how the game is played.  There is no reason to unnecessarily antagonize China by trying to create an Asian alliance against it, but neither should New Delhi let Beijing dictate how it plays the game.  In the long-term, India's strategic interests are not compatible with China.  Once this simple strategic truth is accepted, all else should fall into place. The reason why India's strategic interest are not compatible with China is because India, like other Asian and global powers, has no interest in seeing any one Asian power dominate the continent.  This becomes even more important if China's relative power continues to grow.  India, of course, has other serious disputes too with China, ranging for territorial issues to China's support for Pakistan. None of this means India should not talk to China or engage in trade or frequently exaggerate border incidents.  It does mean that India needs to both engage and balance.

President Xi's visit to India provided a good opportunity to write on some of these issues.  My essay was published in Economic Times, and reproduced below.


India needs to deftly deal with multiple strategic partners, and with China

Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to India and Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the US will cap a very busy three months for India's foreign policy. It has also been a heady period, with India being wooed by multiple strategic partners.

So, India faces a unique problem of plenty in strategic partners. This is a nice problem to have, but it's still a problem. While it is understandable that New Delhi might want to simply celebrate its newfound importance in the international arena, what it needs even more is clear and calculated longterm thinking to navigate this pitfall of opportunities.

Superb Essay on Obama, Bush and US National Security Decision-Making

President Obama's foolish foreign policy choices are finally coming home to roost.  The old saying about a stitch in time saving nine applies very well here: if Obama had provided better levels of support to more moderate Syrian rebels, the Islamic State terrorist might never have become the kind of threat it has in the region, which now requires much harder responses.  There is a lesson in here for Obama's larger foreign policy strategy of disengagement, which is that such disengagement can create conditions that are a lot more dangerous than engagement.  This is not to suggest that levels of engagement should not be carefully thought out, and disengagement might be appropriate under some circumstances, but that disengagement cannot be a doctrine -- especially for the world's most powerful state.

David Rothkopf, editor of the Foreign Policy group, has excellent essay on the decision-making styles of the Bush and Obama White House, which provides a very nuanced picture of the process in both White Houses and which, incidentally, is more objective in examining the Bush foreign policy especially in the second term.

The Strategic Consequences of Russi-Chini Bhai Bhai

The continuing tragedy of the MH-17 shoot-down shows no sign of abating.  But there are deeper strategic consequences too of pushing Russia too hard, forcing it into Beijing's hands.  The point has been made before: Dr. C. Raja Mohan had an essay in the Indian Express in the context of Prime Minister Modi at the BRICS summit.  In a slightly different context in the National Interest, Dimitry K. Simes made a similar point but castigating President Obama's policies.

I wrote in the Economic Times that this might have direct consequences for India.  The essay is reproduced in full below

Sino-Russian Bonhomie Brewing; India Should Be Wary

The tragic shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine is likely to lead to further American pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin. The increasing US-Russia antagonism will have consequences and they will undoubtedly impact India.

There is enough blame to go around for the slow escalation of the Ukraine crisis. Putin's attempt to control Russia's so-called "near abroad" and prevent the expansion of Western influence towards the Russian border has been one element. This is an objective that Russia has pushed with little finesse. The reckless support for the rebels in eastern Ukraine, including the supply of heavy arms and equipment and Russian military forces, was no doubt the immediate cause of the tragic shooting down of the Malaysian airliner (even if it was unintended).

The Absurd UNHRC Resolution on Israel -- And the Equally Absurd Indian Position

The UNHRC, that great defender of global human rights, has once again criticized Israel for the on-going war in Gaza, despite the fact that Israel has repeatedly accepted various ceasefires, while Hamas refuses to, even today.  But considering the general record of the UNHRC on Israel-related issues, this does not comes as much of a surprise.  And supporting the condemnation of Israel were some of the great defenders of human rights such as China, Cuba, Russia and Pakistan.  What was surprising, however, was the Indian position on the issue.  Though it was highly unlikely that India would have supported Israel directly by voting against the resolution -- such moral courage had long disappeared from our 'moral' foreign policy -- the hope was that there would be some adult supervision at the MEA under a Modi government and our diplomacy would not simply be about regurgitating our 1970s third worldist nonsense.  But the Indian statement does not even mention Hamas or the rockets raining down on Israel, hiding behind euphemisms such as 'non-state actors' who are supposedly 'creating obstacles to the peace process'.  Really?? Hamas rockets are just 'obstacles to the peace process'?  What was the 26/11 Mumbai attack? A traffic jam?? Even Navy Pillay -- no great supporter of Israel -- mentioned the Hamas rocket attacks on Israel in her statement.  India's spineless stand at Geneva has already come in for justified criticism.  The argument that the Modi government has not had sufficient time to revise policies is beginning to look increasingly thin.

The US-led Israel-Palestine Peace Process (2013-14) -- How (and Why) It Failed

Apropos my recent essay (previous post) on the war in Gaza, I had argued that Israel should do more to push the peace process with Palestinians, though I also argue that Israel is blamed disproportionately for the failure to reach a final peace agreement.  Now, in New Republic, Ben Birnbaum and Amir Tibon have written an excellent and fairly detailed account of last year's peace process in which US Secretary of State John Kerry tried hard to get the Israeli's and Palestinians to hash out a settlement.  They failed but once again there was plenty of blame to go around and I am sure partisans on all sides will argue for long about who was more to blame.  But they did seem to have come close and that makes the current situation even more tragic.  But this essay is essential reading for those who take simplistic positions on the crisis.