China and the Global Nuclear Order

I took part in a three-part debate in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, along with Hua Han and Gregory Kulacki, on China's role in the global nuclear order.  All three of my short contributions, as well as that of the my co-panelists can be found here.

India's NSG Membership and China's Containment Strategy

This was published by Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, on June 24, 2016.

India’s NSG membership and China’s containment strategy

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting in Seoul on Thursday (June 23) ended without any decision on India’s application for membership as a consequence of China’s refusal to accept India into the group. India’s chance of being admitted into the NSG were always slim because of China’s opposition. But that was not a reason for not trying. There were excellent reasons for making a high-profile push for NSG membership. Most of the criticisms about both the usefulness of NSG membership itself and about the need for such a high-stakes effort are misplaced. Though India did not get the membership, this will be policy failure only if India fails to respond to what is clearly yet another indicator of China’s determined effort at containment of India.

 

India does not need NSG membership in order to engage in nuclear commerce, of course. But the NSG makes the rules for such commerce and it is always possible that they can frame rules in future that will hurt India’s interests. There are already questions about some of the rule changes that NSG introduced in 2011 with regard to enrichment and reprocessing technologies, after India got a special waiver from NSG. India can protect itself best only if it is inside the tent. Additionally, India’s road to a partnership in global governance is ill-served if there are governance groups that explicitly leave India out.

 

Those arguing that India should not have engaged in such a high profile push are also mistaken. India’s choice was to either not apply at all or to make a determined push for membership. There was no middle path here. For at least three reasons, it was impossible for India to simply file an application and not make a serious effort to get in. First, the Indian application required convincing many friendly states who had legitimate concerns about NPT and the nonproliferation regime, concerns that were not motivated by any balance of power considerations (unlike China’s opposition). These countries are wrong to equate support for nonproliferation with just signature on a treaty rather support for the principles of nonproliferation as demonstrated in actual behaviour. But this still required an argument to be made and making this argument to a number of international partners meant that this could no longer be a low-profile effort.

Future of India's Nuclear Doctrine

On April 25, 2016, Pugwash India conducted a discussion on the future of India's nuclear doctrine, chaired by Ambassador Satish Chandra, former Deputy National Security Advisor.  Lt. Gen. B.S. Nagal, former head of India's Strategic Forces Command, and I were the panelists.  Pugwash India has kindly posted a summary of the discussions here.  I might copy that and post it here at a later date, but for now, you'll have to follow the link. 

On the Iranian elections

There has been a good deal of commentary on the recent Iran elections.  My take, published in The Economic Times on June 12, is that this election will not be consequential irrespective of who wins.  The piece was published before the elections but though Hassan Rouhani -- the most moderate and prudent candidate in this limited field -- won convincingly, I would still stand by my original analysis.  Indeed, he might be even more of a challenge than Ahmadinejad both because he is and perceived as more moderate (but who is unlikely to give up Iran's nuclear weapons program) and because he is quite crafty.  Dr. Raja Mohan has a somewhat similar take in the Indian Express, obviously presented much better.  

The inconsequential election of Iran could only spell further doom

By Rajesh Rajagopalan

The results of the Iranian presidential elections this Friday should be important because Iran is central to the stability in the region. Unfortunately, the heavily controlled election, in which religious leaders have barred any candidate who would present an alternative path, means that irrespective of who wins, there is unlikely to be a major change in Iran's policies. 

Discussing Nuke Disarmament at Glion

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GSCP) invited a small group to discuss nuke disarmament at Glion, a small village about a hundred kilometers outside of Geneva (on Lake Geneva), Switzerland.

The discussions were under the Chatham House rule but I can report that it was a fairly useful and innovative approach, with a focus on how security might be maintained after nuclear disarmament.  We discussed some of the challenges, potential institutional and other other response measures and the prospects for stability.  My feeling was that the

insecurity of the weaker members of the current nuclear weapons club (and some of the potential members such as Iran) needed to be taken seriously, may be even more seriously than the concerns of the great powers.  I suspect that even if the major nuclear powers agree to give up nuclear weapons (!!), the smaller ones might be more reluctant because they (countries like Israel, Pakistan, North Korea etc.) pursued nuclear weapons to overcome significant disadvantages in conventional  military power.  Unless there are drastic reductions in conventional military imbalances (if then), it is unlikely that these weaker nuclear weapon powers will give up their nukes.  But it was a good exercise in imagination what might happen in one possible future, at a breathtaking venue.  And the thirty degree Celsius temperature difference with Delhi didn't hurt either!