Do We Need A New COIN Approach?

As India's six-week long national elections continues, Maoists in India's hinterlands have attacked yet again.  And yet again, there are claims of incompetence in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.  But the problems with Indian COIN goes deeper than just soldiers not following SOPs.  I wrote an essay for the Observer Research Analysis (ORF) in New Delhi on some of these issues, specifically in light of a new book on the subject by General Nanavatty, and it is pasted below:

Why is the Indian counter-insurgency failing repeatedly?

As the Indian general election begins, there are fears that Maoist insurgents might attempt to disrupt the polls in areas where they hold sway. Their threats have already prevented political parties from campaigning in these areas. The Maoist ambush in the Sukma district of Chattisgarh last month, which killed 16 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel, indicates again that Indian security forces are yet to learn how to fight this scourge effectively. Temporary setbacks are inevitable in any war, but this is not as much a temporary setback as an illustration of continuing malaise in Indian security operations. Indeed, it represents a larger failure of Indian counter-insurgency approach itself.