Why This Surgical Strike Across LoC Changes Indo-Pak Nuclear Red Lines

This was written a few hours after the Indian strikes across the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu & Kashmir was announced by the Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO) at a press conference in New Delhi on September 29, 2016.  I was already writing a piece for CNN News-18 on deterrence equations across LoC when I saw the press conference.  The result was this quick essay, published on the CNN New-18 website.

Why This Surgical Strike Across LoC Changes Indo-Pak Nuclear Red Lines

The Indian decision to conduct a strike against terrorist bases across the Line of Control (LoC) has important implications for nuclear deterrence and Pakistan's so-called nuclear 'red lines'.  

Though full details of the strike are still awaited, the fact that India publicly announced it and stated that the Indian Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO) had informed his Pakistani counterpart about the attack reinforces India's decision to challenge these nuclear red lines. Irrespective of whether Pakistan responds or even how it responds, the nuclear deterrence game between India and Pakistan has changed.  

The Dialogue-No Dialogue Tango with Pakistan

Most of the debate in the aftermath of the border clashes on the LoC have been on familiar lines, with one corner doubling down on 'dialogue' with Pakistan (without explaining why that has not worked over the last decade) while the other wanted dialogue to stop (without explaining why that has not worked over the last decade either).  There was a refreshing essay in the Times of India by Pavan Varma about India's lack of strategy on Pakistan.

My own take was published in the Economic Times, and reproduced below.

Fearing nuclear escalation, India limits its response to Pakistan’s provocations

In the aftermath of yet another Pakistani transgression, we are back to the tired old arguments about whether or not India should be talking to Pakistan. Proponents argue that nothing has been gained whenever India stopped talking to Pakistan, as it did after every major provocation. Their opponents argue that dialogue has not stopped Pakistan's provocations.

The Maoist Threat

A nice essay by Shekar Gupta in the Indian Express today about the India government's response to the Maoists attack on a group of campaigning Congress leaders in Chattisgarh.  As he correctly points out, not even the ruling party -- let alone the ruling coalition -- is united about how to fight the Maoists and indeed, apparently whether they should be fought at all.  Though many of the worthies in the Congress, including Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde and even Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh attacked the Maoists and characterized them correctly as terrorists, others such K.C. Deo and Digvijaya Singh were true to form, making partisan attacks and looking for what Gupta calls 'root cause' theories.

Another indicator of the difference within the government is the viewpoint of the semi-government, leftist-National Advisory Council (NAC) which is supposed "to provide inputs in the formulation of policy by the government."  The NAC includes people who criticize the government for fighting the Maoists and are great exponents of the root cause theory.  Even when NAC members themselves are targeted, with Maoists letters openly threatening some of them, the first response from some of their sympathizers is that it must be either a mistake or because the Maoists have no control over their cadres.  

The point is that the Maoists have only one, and rather Quixotic aim: overthrowing the Indian state.  And there is only one solution to deal with them: militarily defeat and eliminate the hardcore so that the rest can be brought into the political mainstream.  This does not mean that there are no social or economic issues with regard to poor governance or the general condition of tribals and other disadvantaged groups in India's hinterlands.  The condition in which such disadvantaged Indians live, six decades after India's independence, should be a source of abiding shame.  But for the Maoists, they represent nothing more than an opportunity and an excuse.  The Maoists represent as much of a solution to the problems facing various rural communities as their cousins the Khmer Rouge did in Cambodia.  But given the nature of centre-state relations which prevents proper coordination between different agencies and the poor quality of various paramiltary and special police forces (with exceptions such the AP Police Greyhounds), I expect that the situation will get a lot worse before it gets better.

Morning Reads . . .

• From the Rising Powers Initiative Blog, a nice summary of various Indian and Chinese perspectives on Sino-Indian border dispute and relations.
• Raja Mohan has a great essay on the Indian Express website on being realistic about Sino-Indian relations in the light of the Sino-Pakistan alliance.
• Global Times clearly sees the Taiwan-Philippines spat as a way to bring Taiwan closer to the mainland. 
• An Insight Crime analysis (via the Small Wars Journal Blog) by Steven Dudley and Viridiana Rios of the rapid expansion of the Zetas, the Mexican drug cartel.