Considering Trump and New Delhi

C. Raja Mohan wrote a typical thoughtful and thought-provoking essay yesterday in the Indian Express on why New Delhi should take Donald Trump seriously, despite his contradictions.  Now that Trump looks like the presumptive Republican nominee after his impressive win in the Indiana primary, Raja Mohan's points are even more critical.  He is a typical populist politician, one whose support is based on ideas or ideology or even simple consistency but on just the strength of his personality. Raja Mohan is right to point to Trump's larger worldview rather than the specific policy points regarding India.  As he put it: "The significance of Trump for Delhi’s diplomacy may not necessarily lie in the few stray comments he has made about India. Nor do his occasional remarks on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons suggest a definitive shift. Although Trump’s overall attitude towards India has been positive, it’s his larger worldview that will have a great bearing on India’s strategic choices."

I think this is a point that not just New Delhi needs to keep in mind but most of US allies -- and US adversaries.  Even if Trump does not win the Presidency -- this is by no means certain, as some Democrats like the political commentator Van Jones is trying desperately to tell their party -- he is quite likely to move the entire conversation to the Left on critical issues such as (as Raja Mohan pointed out, correctly) on trade, but also on US commitment to its allies because, as Trump has pointed out, US allies don't pay their fair share of the burden of the common defense.  This is an old issue within US alliances, but what Trump forgets is that old Spiderman quote: with great power comes great responsibility. Or may be it is greater responsibility.  Still, Trump's focus is likely shift domestic argument, and Hillary Clinton -- assuming she is the Democratic nominee -- is also likely to agree that burden-sharing needs to be revisited.  This should be serious worry for all US allies -- and for countries like India which, though not a formal US ally, depends on the US to help balance China in Asia.  Much of the discussion of unipolarity and the post cold war international system has focused on calculations of material power to assess polarity.  But they have rarely considered the willingness of the US to carry the burden of managing and maintaining global order.  And Defensive Realists, who have repeatedly called for the US to reduce its global footprint with an off-shore balancing strategy, do not consider the consequences of such a posture for regional stability and its consequent impact on global order.  If Trump wins in November, and if he carries through with his promise, India and other Asian powers will find that the biggest problem will be to convince the US that it has to play a role as a balancer in Asia.  This raises unpalatable choices for India and other Asian states -- either acquiesce in a China-dominated Asia or expend a lot more effort in trying to balance China.  It might become difficult to find a hedge to perch on then. 

Did Rajiv Gandhi Really Plan to Go to War with Pakistan to Save the Najibullah regime?

Maybe. 

This is one of the several little nuggets I found in an essay on Soviet-Indian relations in the last decade of the Cold War.  It was published as a chapter in 2011 by Sergey Radchenko in a book he co-edited with Artemy M. Kalinovsky, The End of the Cold War and the Third World:New Perspectives on Regional Conflict based on declassified East bloc archives.  [I had not seen this earlier; it was bought to my attention by Yogesh Joshi, one of my PhD students]. I have little doubt that the documentary evidence Radchenko presents is credible, even if I might quibble with some interpretations.  The broad argument that Radchenko makes is that both Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi were somewhat naïve not only about international politics but also about Soviet-Indian relations.  It also shows both sides maneuvering around each other in a manner that reveals somewhat greater crudity (in the best Realist sense of the word!) than I would have imagined.  But it also reveals a lot of other things, including India’s unhealthy obsession with Pakistan and – despite Indira Gandhi’s and Rajiv Gandhi’s successful state visits to the US and generally improving US-India ties – deep and abiding Indian suspicions about the US. 

Now to the juicy bits:

More Flux in South Asian Alignments

In July, I had written an essay in Economic Times arguing that closer Sino-Russian relations could spell trouble for India down the road.  As relations between the West and Russia tumble further, we can expect Moscow and Beijing to get closer.  This could have potential blowback on Russian-Indian relations.  Before his trip to US, Prime Minister Modi strongly defended Russia.  When he was asked by Fareed Zakaria about Russian annexation of Crimea, he replied in part:

"There's a saying in India that the person who should throw a stone first is the person who has not committed any sins.  In the world right now, a lot of people want to give advice, but look within them, and they, too, have sinned in some way.

Ultimately India's viewpoint is that efforts need to be made to sit together and talk and to resolve problems in an ongoing process."

Such support is understandable given India's long strategic association with Russia/Soviet Union. But this might become increasingly untenable, and New Delhi needs to be careful about how Russia's increasing closeness to China affects Indian interests.  India needs Russian support in a variety of international bodies, on a number of issues, from NSG membership to dealing with a post-American Afghanistan.  And of course, the Indian military is mostly still dependent on Russian arms. The question is whether Moscow's support to India on these issues will now weaken somewhat.

Now comes news that Russia and Pakistan are seeking somewhat closer military ties, news that has been largely ignored in the Indian media. The last time such ties developed was in the late 1960s, when the Soviet Union attempted a brief neutrality between the two countries in order to promote a South Asian settlement, hoping that a less divided subcontinent under Moscow's protection might help it against both Beijing and Washington.  That move went nowhere fast, annoying India without getting much out of Pakistan.  Maybe it will be no different this time either, but it bears watching.  President Putin will be in Delhi next month and it should give India some idea about Russian attitudes.  Of course, the fact that Modi has just invited Obama to be the Republic Day guest is not likely to go down well in Moscow. All in all, a period of greater flux and uncertainty in regional alignments.

The Strategic Consequences of Russi-Chini Bhai Bhai

The continuing tragedy of the MH-17 shoot-down shows no sign of abating.  But there are deeper strategic consequences too of pushing Russia too hard, forcing it into Beijing's hands.  The point has been made before: Dr. C. Raja Mohan had an essay in the Indian Express in the context of Prime Minister Modi at the BRICS summit.  In a slightly different context in the National Interest, Dimitry K. Simes made a similar point but castigating President Obama's policies.

I wrote in the Economic Times that this might have direct consequences for India.  The essay is reproduced in full below

Sino-Russian Bonhomie Brewing; India Should Be Wary

The tragic shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine is likely to lead to further American pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin. The increasing US-Russia antagonism will have consequences and they will undoubtedly impact India.

There is enough blame to go around for the slow escalation of the Ukraine crisis. Putin's attempt to control Russia's so-called "near abroad" and prevent the expansion of Western influence towards the Russian border has been one element. This is an objective that Russia has pushed with little finesse. The reckless support for the rebels in eastern Ukraine, including the supply of heavy arms and equipment and Russian military forces, was no doubt the immediate cause of the tragic shooting down of the Malaysian airliner (even if it was unintended).

The Crimean Crisis

The Crimean crisis might not be the beginning of a new cold war, but it clearly reflects some of the problems with Obama's foreign policy as I argued in a piece on Economic Times (online), pasted below:

Crimea Tilts Power Equations

The consequences of Vlamidir Putin’s ‘land-grab’ are likely to reverberate for some time.  Not even traditional friends and anti-Western compatriots like New Delhi and Beijing are entirely comfortable with Putin’s initiative.

India’s default option – to side with neither side in the dispute – might be understandable because on the one hand India does not want unilateral referendums to become an international norm considering its own position in Kashmir but on the other hand New Delhi’s natural political instinct is not to side with the West against anybody, especially a traditional friend like Russia.  

PM Manmohan Singh's visit to Russia and China

I am posting this almost two weeks after it was published, unfortunately.  This is essay in Economic Times of October 21, 2013 on the PM's visit to Russia and China.

Too many unclear policies in PM Manmohan Singh's holdall

Over the next few days, PM Manmohan Singh will summit with the leaders of Russia and China.  Along with his recent meeting with US President Barack Obama, it completes a trifecta of sorts. Unfortunately, in this great power trifecta, India appears to have neither skill nor luck. At the end of his term, the PM has the unenviable task of trying to climb out of the strategic hole into which we have dug ourselves.