The Absurd UNHRC Resolution on Israel -- And the Equally Absurd Indian Position

The UNHRC, that great defender of global human rights, has once again criticized Israel for the on-going war in Gaza, despite the fact that Israel has repeatedly accepted various ceasefires, while Hamas refuses to, even today.  But considering the general record of the UNHRC on Israel-related issues, this does not comes as much of a surprise.  And supporting the condemnation of Israel were some of the great defenders of human rights such as China, Cuba, Russia and Pakistan.  What was surprising, however, was the Indian position on the issue.  Though it was highly unlikely that India would have supported Israel directly by voting against the resolution -- such moral courage had long disappeared from our 'moral' foreign policy -- the hope was that there would be some adult supervision at the MEA under a Modi government and our diplomacy would not simply be about regurgitating our 1970s third worldist nonsense.  But the Indian statement does not even mention Hamas or the rockets raining down on Israel, hiding behind euphemisms such as 'non-state actors' who are supposedly 'creating obstacles to the peace process'.  Really?? Hamas rockets are just 'obstacles to the peace process'?  What was the 26/11 Mumbai attack? A traffic jam?? Even Navy Pillay -- no great supporter of Israel -- mentioned the Hamas rocket attacks on Israel in her statement.  India's spineless stand at Geneva has already come in for justified criticism.  The argument that the Modi government has not had sufficient time to revise policies is beginning to look increasingly thin.

The US-led Israel-Palestine Peace Process (2013-14) -- How (and Why) It Failed

Apropos my recent essay (previous post) on the war in Gaza, I had argued that Israel should do more to push the peace process with Palestinians, though I also argue that Israel is blamed disproportionately for the failure to reach a final peace agreement.  Now, in New Republic, Ben Birnbaum and Amir Tibon have written an excellent and fairly detailed account of last year's peace process in which US Secretary of State John Kerry tried hard to get the Israeli's and Palestinians to hash out a settlement.  They failed but once again there was plenty of blame to go around and I am sure partisans on all sides will argue for long about who was more to blame.  But they did seem to have come close and that makes the current situation even more tragic.  But this essay is essential reading for those who take simplistic positions on the crisis.

India, Israel and the newest Gaza War

The latest conflagration in Gaza has been accompanied by the predictable one-sided analyses of what is a very complicated problem.  Israel clearly has to do more to push the peace process but the reason why the process has not so far achieved a solution cannot all be laid at Israel's door either.  In this latest escalation in particular, Israel has been far, far more sinned against by any stretch of the imagination.  But those blaming Israel, including an essay in the Hindu by Vijay Prashad, are not above twisting the facts to make their case.  Prashad defends the terrorists of Hamas, writing that "[I]ts rockets fired after Israel began its aerial bombing of Gaza", a blatant distortion that even cursory research will disprove.

My essay on the crisis was posted on the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) website a few hours back. Posted below in full.  

India, Israel and the Gaza War

As the fighting in Gaza threatens to escalate further, the Indian government has taken the prudent and correct approach by refusing to be stampeded into foolish parliamentary resolutions that will do nothing to either help in resolving the crisis nor in advancing India's interests.

The Ministry of External Affairs had already stated that India was concerned about the situation, pointing to both the civilian casualties in Gaza and also the rocket attacks on Israel. Politicians might want to grandstand in the parliament for the benefit of domestic audiences by blaming Israel entirely for the current crisis. But
that would neither help Indian interests nor be accurate.

International Politics and Security After Nuclear Disarmament

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy convened a conference last year looking at 'Security in A World Without Nuclear Weapons'.  One meeting was held in Glion, Switzerland last summer and the report is now out.  I contributed a chapter on "Power Balances and the Prospects for a Stable Post-Nuclear Weapons World."  I suggested that a post-nuclear weapons world will not be very different for most states because they were not really affected one way or another by nuclear weapons, except indirectly if a nuclear war took place which would affect everybody.  But nuclear disarmament would create issues for countries that were defended either directly or indirectly (i.e., with extended deterrence) with nuclear weapons.  In some cases, especially for states such as Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, all of which perceive significant conventional threats and for whom nuclear weapons represent the great equalizer, nuclear abolition would create serious problems.  I predict that they would be the ones most resistant to nuclear disarmament, should that become a serious possibility.  GCSP organized a public discussion in Geneva to launch the report in which I participated.

The Iran Nuke Deal

The nuclear deal between Iran and the P-5+1 have obviously received a lot of attention.  The general opinion in India and Asia appears to be favourable to the deal, as the Regional Powers Initiative (RPI) noted.  I am less impressed and I think this has potentially dangerous longer term consequences.  My take was published in Economic Times and is reproduced below.

Iran Nuclear Deal: Short-Term Benefits and Long-Term Consequences

US President Barack Obama has won a much-needed foreign political victory by sealing a temporary nuclear deal with Iran. But while there are some short-term benefits, the long term consequences of this deal are much more hazy and potentially quite dangerous. Equally worrying should be the consequences of the deal for nuclear weapon spreading in the Middle East and the larger political effects on America's friends and allies, especially in the region and in Asia.

Avner Cohen on Israel's Nuclear Decision, October 1973

A nice essay by Avner Cohen on the Israeli decision-making during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.  The general sense until now has been that, facing an increasingly difficult situation on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, Israel readied its nuclear arsenal.  There was always some doubt about whether this was because Israel feared that it was about to lose the war and wanted to Arab states down with it if it came to that or if it was a signal to the US to come to its assistance.  Cohen suggests, based on interviews with insiders to the decision-making process and declassified minutes of key meetings, that with the exception of Moshe Dayan, the Israeli cabinet exercised restraint.  Dayan's proposal for a nuclear 'demonstration' was not followed through. What exactly that demonstration would have been is not clear, though Cohen speculates that it could have been a nighttime high-altitude nuclear airburst that would be visible from key Arab cities.  Though I have no expertise on Israeli nuclear issues, as an option, such a demonstration would appear to have been politically quite difficult.  Though Cohen discounts it, a more credible demonstration would have been an underground nuclear test.  But Cohen's essay also outlines some of the problems of oral history as also the absolute necessity of such research tactics especially where state secrecy on a subject matter is so great.  Anyway, a great essay by the key chronicler of the Israeli nuclear establishment.