India's NSG Membership and China's Containment Strategy

This was published by Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, on June 24, 2016.

India’s NSG membership and China’s containment strategy

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting in Seoul on Thursday (June 23) ended without any decision on India’s application for membership as a consequence of China’s refusal to accept India into the group. India’s chance of being admitted into the NSG were always slim because of China’s opposition. But that was not a reason for not trying. There were excellent reasons for making a high-profile push for NSG membership. Most of the criticisms about both the usefulness of NSG membership itself and about the need for such a high-stakes effort are misplaced. Though India did not get the membership, this will be policy failure only if India fails to respond to what is clearly yet another indicator of China’s determined effort at containment of India.

 

India does not need NSG membership in order to engage in nuclear commerce, of course. But the NSG makes the rules for such commerce and it is always possible that they can frame rules in future that will hurt India’s interests. There are already questions about some of the rule changes that NSG introduced in 2011 with regard to enrichment and reprocessing technologies, after India got a special waiver from NSG. India can protect itself best only if it is inside the tent. Additionally, India’s road to a partnership in global governance is ill-served if there are governance groups that explicitly leave India out.

 

Those arguing that India should not have engaged in such a high profile push are also mistaken. India’s choice was to either not apply at all or to make a determined push for membership. There was no middle path here. For at least three reasons, it was impossible for India to simply file an application and not make a serious effort to get in. First, the Indian application required convincing many friendly states who had legitimate concerns about NPT and the nonproliferation regime, concerns that were not motivated by any balance of power considerations (unlike China’s opposition). These countries are wrong to equate support for nonproliferation with just signature on a treaty rather support for the principles of nonproliferation as demonstrated in actual behaviour. But this still required an argument to be made and making this argument to a number of international partners meant that this could no longer be a low-profile effort.

India and BRICS: Looking for Love . . . .

As Prime Minister Modi departs for the BRICS summit, I could not help recalling this old Johnny Lee country western song when thinking of Indian policy on BRICS . . .

But jokes aside, I was impressed that the Prime Minister's departure statement notably ignores some of the nonsense that usually finds its way into Indian foreign policy statements such as the mantra-like call for multipolarity.  The statement focused largely on economic issues, largely unobjectionable.
Now we need to see if PM Modi will push that pragmatism in the course of the actual discussions at BRICS, especially with Russia and China.  Both Moscow and Beijing have their own axe to grind with the US.  There is little reason why India should become part of their agenda.

Shall We Bank on BRICS, A Coalition of Unequals?

I wrote a short opinion piece on the politics around the BRICS Bank for the Economic Times.  I argued that China is likely to dominate the BRICS because of the disparity in wealth between China and the other BRICS.