India Now Controls the Escalation Ladder

Another essay published a couple of days back (October 5, 2016) by the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, on the consequences of the Indian cross-LoC strikes.

INDIA NOW CONTROLS THE ESCALATION LADDER

The deterrence game between India and Pakistan has changed dramatically with India’s
decision to conduct a military strike across the Line of Control (LoC). The Indian action was a
clear escalation that demonstrated that India has the upper hand to control escalation and
thus possibly deter Pakistan more effectively. This upends the escalation dynamic between
India and Pakistan because it was Pakistan that controlled escalation until now.

This change will not go unchallenged by Pakistan. Rawalpindi can be expected to probe and
attempt to undermine India’s new assertion of escalation dominance. New Delhi, therefore,
needs to be ready to cement this assertion by being prepared to play its much stronger hand,
especially in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK).

Why New Delhi allowed a militarily weaker Pakistan to control the escalation dynamic for so
long is a mystery. The general consensus on deterrence and escalation in the region that was
focused much more on the constraints facing India than that facing Pakistan surely is one reason. This was the consequence of Pakistan’s effective use of the threat of nuclear
escalation and the fear, particularly among Indian decision-makers, that Pakistan was an
irrational actor whose nuclear threats needed to be taken seriously. This was reinforced by
India’s efforts to position itself as the more responsible player in the region, aimed at a global
audience, which might also have limited the willingness of Indian leaders to consider use-of-force options.

Why This Surgical Strike Across LoC Changes Indo-Pak Nuclear Red Lines

This was written a few hours after the Indian strikes across the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu & Kashmir was announced by the Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO) at a press conference in New Delhi on September 29, 2016.  I was already writing a piece for CNN News-18 on deterrence equations across LoC when I saw the press conference.  The result was this quick essay, published on the CNN New-18 website.

Why This Surgical Strike Across LoC Changes Indo-Pak Nuclear Red Lines

The Indian decision to conduct a strike against terrorist bases across the Line of Control (LoC) has important implications for nuclear deterrence and Pakistan's so-called nuclear 'red lines'.  

Though full details of the strike are still awaited, the fact that India publicly announced it and stated that the Indian Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO) had informed his Pakistani counterpart about the attack reinforces India's decision to challenge these nuclear red lines. Irrespective of whether Pakistan responds or even how it responds, the nuclear deterrence game between India and Pakistan has changed.  

Why the new Balochistan strategy is the best option for India

Prime Minister Modi's Baloch initiative has garnered significant amount of comment, a good part of it critical or at least concerned.  I am much more optimist about the utility, though I am also concerned that this might simply stop at the rhetorical level, which will end up doing more harm than good.  My essay was published by ORF on August 22, and is reproduced below in full.

WHY THE NEW BALOCHISTAN STRATEGY IS THE BEST OPTION FOR INDIA

Only time will tell if Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s reference to Balochistan in his
Independence Day speech was a carefully thought out strategy or just an expression of his
personal frustration at two years of fruitless effort at dialogue with Pakistan. Hopefully, it is
the former because there is considerable strategic logic for India to exploit whatever
vulnerabilities Pakistan has in Balochistan. But this logic requires the Modi government to go
beyond simply rhetorical nourishes to develop and implement plans that can impose
significant cost to the Pakistan Army.

The Prime Minister’s reference to Balochistan was clearly a rhetorical shot across the bow to
deter Pakistan’s continued support for terrorism targeting India. In this case, that Prime
Minister Modi felt the need to outline the threat so openly suggests two conclusions. First,
that it is an escalatory policy to deter Pakistan’s support for terrorism against India, with his
speech being the first step in that escalation. If this assessment is correct, if Pakistan does
not heed the warning, then the speech will be followed in time by more significant steps on
the ground. The Prime Minister cannot have been unaware that making such an open threat
carries a commitment and responsibility because there will be an expectation of a follow
through. This is one reason why governments — and defnitely leaders — do not often make
such open threats. Even though a deterrence strategy requires communicating a clear threat,
such communications can be delivered in a number of different ways such as through media
leaks, through subtle actions such as meetings (in this case) with Baloch rebel leaders, as well
as through greater and more visible material support to Baloch rebel groups. Making such an
open threat suggests a pre-commitment to follow through with the threat if the threat does
not lead to the desired change in behaviour. At least, one hopes so.

India's Nuclear Doctrine Debate

As usual, I am posting this very late.  I wrote a paper on India's nuclear doctrine debate for a Carnegie-MacArthur project on "Regional Voices on the Challenge of Nuclear Deterrence Stability in South Asia".  The papers were posted on the Carnegie website in late June.  The project included a number of interesting papers from a range of Chinese, Pakistani and Indian analysts.  All papers are available here.  My paper can be found here.  As always, comments are welcome.  

Change Pak army terror calculus by supporting domestic rebels in Pakistan

The terrorist attack on the Pathankot Indian Air Force base once again highlights the problematic nature of India's 'talk-no talk' strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan.  I had written about this earlier too, in 2008 in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attack, and in August 2015, in the aftermath of the Gurdsapur attack and pressure on the Indian government to cancel NSA (National Security Advisor)-level talks. My views on the subject have remained fairly consistent: to respond to Pakistan's transgressions, India needs alternatives to simply calling off talks.  Calling off talks is usually a foolish gesture.  India needs to develop military and covert measures to deter and punish the Pakistan army's use of terror against India. 

Though I argue that India should not discontinue talks, I also argue that continuing talks without responding to terrorist attacks and other outrages by the Pakistan army is equally foolish -- and unsustainable.  Since this essay was published a few days back, other analysts, who are far more knowledgeable about Pakistan, have pointed out that much of the supposed 'action' that Pakistan is taking against the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorists is the usual drama they have engaged in many times before, without any real effort at curbing these terrorist organizations, in essence a farce to placate foreign leaders.  This is eminently understandable because the Pakistan army feels no pressure to take any real action, and as I point out in the essay, it is a high-benefit, low-cost and low-risk strategy.  If, as seems likely, the talks were to continue, we should expect more attacks, unless India can develop options to change the Pakistan army's calculus.  My essay, published by the Observer Research Foundation, is reproduced below.


Suspending talks is surrendering to Pak Army strategy

In the aftermath of the terror attack in Pathankot, the pressure on Prime Minister Narendra Modi to suspend dialogue with Pakistan is mounting.  Even if he resists the pressure this time, the India-Pakistan dialogue will constantly be at risk because the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) can sponsor more terror attacks until it becomes politically impossible for the Modi government to continue the dialogue.  As long as India’s only response to terror attacks is to suspend talks, the Pakistan Army will hold the upper hand.  Suspension of talks does not impose any cost on the Pakistan army; indeed, it is what they seek.  India needs to develop alternate counter-measures so that it has options other than suspension of talks.  Indian decision-makers need to understand the Pakistan army’s support for terrorism as a rational and usually effective strategy if India is to develop such counter-measures that increase the costs and reduce the benefits to the Pakistan army in using terror as a strategy.

Did Rajiv Gandhi Really Plan to Go to War with Pakistan to Save the Najibullah regime?

Maybe. 

This is one of the several little nuggets I found in an essay on Soviet-Indian relations in the last decade of the Cold War.  It was published as a chapter in 2011 by Sergey Radchenko in a book he co-edited with Artemy M. Kalinovsky, The End of the Cold War and the Third World:New Perspectives on Regional Conflict based on declassified East bloc archives.  [I had not seen this earlier; it was bought to my attention by Yogesh Joshi, one of my PhD students]. I have little doubt that the documentary evidence Radchenko presents is credible, even if I might quibble with some interpretations.  The broad argument that Radchenko makes is that both Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi were somewhat naïve not only about international politics but also about Soviet-Indian relations.  It also shows both sides maneuvering around each other in a manner that reveals somewhat greater crudity (in the best Realist sense of the word!) than I would have imagined.  But it also reveals a lot of other things, including India’s unhealthy obsession with Pakistan and – despite Indira Gandhi’s and Rajiv Gandhi’s successful state visits to the US and generally improving US-India ties – deep and abiding Indian suspicions about the US. 

Now to the juicy bits:

Mehta's essay on Pakistan: A brief critique

I generally enjoy reading Pratap Bhanu Mehta's essays, specially his always trenchant analysis of Indian politics.  His essay last week is a fine exemplar, outlining the deeper institutional difficulties that face Prime Minister Modi, which Modi unfortunately does not seem to be paying much attention to.  Mehta's position is always that of a true Liberal, and he appears not to take a position first and let the analysis follow, but decide on his position based on his analysis.  Such analytical commitment and honesty is rare anywhere but especially in India.

But Liberalism has serious flaws when it comes to understanding international politics. I had earlier posted a brief comment on another essay of his where I disagreed with his view of Indian policy on Pakistan, which he characterized as Realism.  His latest essay gives me another chance to provide a brief Realist critique of the Liberal view of India-Pakistan relations.

International Politics and Security After Nuclear Disarmament

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy convened a conference last year looking at 'Security in A World Without Nuclear Weapons'.  One meeting was held in Glion, Switzerland last summer and the report is now out.  I contributed a chapter on "Power Balances and the Prospects for a Stable Post-Nuclear Weapons World."  I suggested that a post-nuclear weapons world will not be very different for most states because they were not really affected one way or another by nuclear weapons, except indirectly if a nuclear war took place which would affect everybody.  But nuclear disarmament would create issues for countries that were defended either directly or indirectly (i.e., with extended deterrence) with nuclear weapons.  In some cases, especially for states such as Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, all of which perceive significant conventional threats and for whom nuclear weapons represent the great equalizer, nuclear abolition would create serious problems.  I predict that they would be the ones most resistant to nuclear disarmament, should that become a serious possibility.  GCSP organized a public discussion in Geneva to launch the report in which I participated.

Atul Mishra's comments on Pakistan and Syria

Atul Mishra, who teaches at Central University of Gujarat, (blogs here) responded by email to a couple of my essays in Economic Times which I had posted here.  [Full disclosure: We are academic collaborators and currently have a jointly-authored book manuscript under review].  With his permission, I am posting both his comments/questions and my responses.

Atul:

About Pakistan. Don't our guys do the same thing across the LoC? They must be fools to not do it. And if they do, does it really matter whether our deterrence works or not? After all, we get our revenge. We can be seen to be doing more, having a strategy, but largely for domestic eyes; no? What is the point of going into PoK if not to recover it and cause Pakistan deep damage (read, break up)? 

The Dialogue-No Dialogue Tango with Pakistan

Most of the debate in the aftermath of the border clashes on the LoC have been on familiar lines, with one corner doubling down on 'dialogue' with Pakistan (without explaining why that has not worked over the last decade) while the other wanted dialogue to stop (without explaining why that has not worked over the last decade either).  There was a refreshing essay in the Times of India by Pavan Varma about India's lack of strategy on Pakistan.

My own take was published in the Economic Times, and reproduced below.

Fearing nuclear escalation, India limits its response to Pakistan’s provocations

In the aftermath of yet another Pakistani transgression, we are back to the tired old arguments about whether or not India should be talking to Pakistan. Proponents argue that nothing has been gained whenever India stopped talking to Pakistan, as it did after every major provocation. Their opponents argue that dialogue has not stopped Pakistan's provocations.

Will Pak Elections Improve India-Pakistan Relations?

Colour me skeptical.  I gave my take on the elections in Pakistan and its impact on relations with Pakistan  in a brief piece in Economic Times.  Here's the link to the essay.  I argued that there was too much irrational exuberance and not enough realism in New Delhi about Pakistan.  Neither democracy nor good intentions alone are sufficient.  I am pasting the full essay below as published:

India seems almost as excited by Pakistan’s election results as Nawaz Sharif

By Rajesh Rajagopalan

New Delhi seems almost as excited by Pakistan's election results as Nawaz Sharif. Manmohan Singh's gushing letter to Sharif was probably to be expected. Even the BJP has joined the general consensus that the strengthening of democracy in Pakistan would improve India-Pakistan relations. But the India-Pakistan dispute was not caused by military rule in Pakistan and the strengthening of democracy, which this election surely indicates, will have only marginal effects on improving India-Pakistan relations.

The Pakistani Godfathers of the Taliban

As Afghanistan reaches yet another turning point with the withdrawal of American and other international forces, Pakistan's role becomes ever more crucial.  I have littledoubt that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistan Army are calling the shots in Afghanistan (to the extent that any one calls any shots in Afghanistan) and that their control over at least the south of Afghanistan is fairly certain (though there is some Taliban presence in the north around Kunduz too, apparently, according to folks who know a lot more about this stuff than I do).  Here's a nice, brief essay by Adrian Hanni and Lukas Hegi in the Small Wars Journal on ISI and Pakistani links with the Taliban, going back to their origins.  Nothing dramatically new, but it puts together much of the story for a quick read.