The Structural Consequences of China's Rise

I wrote an essay on "The Structural Consequences of China's Rise" for a conference on "the US Rebalance and the Asia-Pacific Region", organized by the Centre for Public Policy Research, Kochi. The papers have now been put together by CPPR and is available as a book. My essay, more a brief and slightly abstract think-piece, is pasted below.  

 

I have tried to explore the impact of China's rise from a Structural Realist perspective.  One of my concerns with Structural Realism is its focus on just great power politics.  Though Kenneth Waltz and other have their justification for such a focus (that great powers are more consequential) I think it is time that Structural Realists, and other Realists, started focusing more on regional politics. This is one among a few of my early explorations of how this might be done, so comments are very welcome.   

 

 

The Structural Consequences of China's Rise

Rajesh Rajagopalan

China's rise, over the medium term, can lead to three possible structural consequences,

depending on different permutations of Chinese and US economic growth rates. These are (in random

order) a continuation of the current unipolar order; a bipolar system with China joining the United

States (US) as a polar power; and a multipolar system in which China and one or more powers join the

US as polar powers. Over the long term, there are other possibilities such as a non-polar order or a

unipolar system with China as the unipole, but these are not considered here.

Handling Great Power Relations

The Asian security situation is slowly deteriorating, the consequence of both China's rise as well Washington's seeming fickleness that is sending its allies such as Japan looking for new allies in the region.  But its not just Japan that is feeling the effect of insecurity: Vietnam (where Indian President just completed a state visit) and Australia (whose Prime Minister Tony Abbot also was in Delhi recently) are also worried, as are others which have territorial disputes with China, such as the Philippines.  But China is taking efforts to prevent these Asian powers from coming together, primarily focusing on India and Australia.  That is smart and prudent strategy.  President Xi visit to India this week has to be seen in this light.

But from India's perspective, it has to be clear-eyed about how the game is played.  There is no reason to unnecessarily antagonize China by trying to create an Asian alliance against it, but neither should New Delhi let Beijing dictate how it plays the game.  In the long-term, India's strategic interests are not compatible with China.  Once this simple strategic truth is accepted, all else should fall into place. The reason why India's strategic interest are not compatible with China is because India, like other Asian and global powers, has no interest in seeing any one Asian power dominate the continent.  This becomes even more important if China's relative power continues to grow.  India, of course, has other serious disputes too with China, ranging for territorial issues to China's support for Pakistan. None of this means India should not talk to China or engage in trade or frequently exaggerate border incidents.  It does mean that India needs to both engage and balance.

President Xi's visit to India provided a good opportunity to write on some of these issues.  My essay was published in Economic Times, and reproduced below.


India needs to deftly deal with multiple strategic partners, and with China

Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to India and Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the US will cap a very busy three months for India's foreign policy. It has also been a heady period, with India being wooed by multiple strategic partners.

So, India faces a unique problem of plenty in strategic partners. This is a nice problem to have, but it's still a problem. While it is understandable that New Delhi might want to simply celebrate its newfound importance in the international arena, what it needs even more is clear and calculated longterm thinking to navigate this pitfall of opportunities.

World War-1 and Asian Stability

In late June, SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation jointly organized their annual conference on Asian security, the Berlin Conference on Asian Security.  The theme this time was if the conditions that led to the First World War a hundred years ago are being replicated in Asia today.  The discussions were under the Chatham House rule, but Amitav Acharya, who was also present, wrote an essay in Economic Times on the same issue.  I wrote an essay in Economic Times too which appeared a couple of days after Amitav's piece.  We obviously disagree.  My essay is reproduced below.

There has, of course been a debate a long debate, ever since the early 1990s, whether Asian multipolarity was going to lead to conflict.  Aaron Friedberg fired the first shot arguing that Asia does not even have some of the advantages that Europe had to ameliorate potential conflicts and that it was therefore 'ripe for rivalry'.  Other including David Kang and Amitav Acharya disagreed, suggesting different reasons why Asia was unlikely to replicate European patterns.  While much of the evidence appeared to support the anti-Realist case so far, I would think that the developments over the past few years definitely support the Realist case for pessimism about the prospects for stability in the region.

Is Asia Heading Towards World War-like Conditions?

On June 28, 1914, the crown prince of the Austro-Hungarian empire Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo, starting a chain of events that directly led to the First World War a month later. The war had dramatic consequences, killing almost ten million, destroying several great powers, remaking the  global map, heralding the general decline of Europe and leading eventually to the rise of the US and the Soviet Union.

The Limitations of an India-Japan Partnership

India invited Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to be the Chief Guest at India's Republic Day celebrations, signalling a new closeness in their ties.  Most of the commentary in India and around the world noted the strategic significance of the invitation, and the Indian commentariat was uniformly positive.  I am somewhat skeptical but not because I don't see the strategic value in the relationship, especially in balancing China.  It has to do more with my sense that both governments -- like democracies in general -- tend to look for short-term buck-passing solutions rather than real balancing, which requires a certain clarity, consistency and commitment.  A short essay that I wrote on this was posted a couple of days back on the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) website, and is reproduced in full below.   

The Limitations of India-Japan Partnership

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's short visit was high on symbolism but both countries need to carefully assess the utility as well as the limits of their partnership. While trade between the two countries have grown dramatically, the primary driver in the relationship has been strategic necessity, their shared concern about an increasingly strong but aggressive China. 

The Iran Nuke Deal

The nuclear deal between Iran and the P-5+1 have obviously received a lot of attention.  The general opinion in India and Asia appears to be favourable to the deal, as the Regional Powers Initiative (RPI) noted.  I am less impressed and I think this has potentially dangerous longer term consequences.  My take was published in Economic Times and is reproduced below.

Iran Nuclear Deal: Short-Term Benefits and Long-Term Consequences

US President Barack Obama has won a much-needed foreign political victory by sealing a temporary nuclear deal with Iran. But while there are some short-term benefits, the long term consequences of this deal are much more hazy and potentially quite dangerous. Equally worrying should be the consequences of the deal for nuclear weapon spreading in the Middle East and the larger political effects on America's friends and allies, especially in the region and in Asia.