Dealing with President Donald Trump

This was published on the ORF website on November 10, immediately after the US elections. (Posting it late as usual!).

As the shock of the US election result wears off, the reality of having to figure out how to deal with new President Donald Trump becomes imperative. The normal guide-posts that we would use to evaluate the foreign and security policies of any candidate for high-office are the candidate’s election programme or manifesto, statements made during or before the campaign or the candidate’s previous political record. Unfortunately, none of the usual guideposts are very useful in helping us wade through Trump’s worldview, policy preferences or priorities. Trump seems to make up policies on the go, and there are some contradictions in what he has said on foreign policy issues, though some analysts such as Thomas Wright have argued that there is some long-term consistency to Trumps foreign policy pronouncements.

The problem is compounded by Trump’s lack of any previous political or administrative
position of responsibility in the government or the legislature. Focusing on what Trump said during the campaign, the only other source of his thinking paints a mixed picture, for three reasons. The first is that some of his policies are internally contradictory: for example, he blames the Obama administration for ignoring American allies, but also blames American allies as free-riders who don’t pay their fair share of the defence burden. The second is that some of his policies will clash with other policies: he wants to cooperate with Russia in Syria in tackling the threat of the Islamic State but also takes a hard line on Iran, with which Russia is aligned in Syria. Finally, it is not clear whether his statements on foreign policy are personal ruminations or well-thought policy positions. His foreign and security policy agenda are somewhat thin on specifics, though some of his speeches provide some details.

Considering Trump and New Delhi

C. Raja Mohan wrote a typical thoughtful and thought-provoking essay yesterday in the Indian Express on why New Delhi should take Donald Trump seriously, despite his contradictions.  Now that Trump looks like the presumptive Republican nominee after his impressive win in the Indiana primary, Raja Mohan's points are even more critical.  He is a typical populist politician, one whose support is based on ideas or ideology or even simple consistency but on just the strength of his personality. Raja Mohan is right to point to Trump's larger worldview rather than the specific policy points regarding India.  As he put it: "The significance of Trump for Delhi’s diplomacy may not necessarily lie in the few stray comments he has made about India. Nor do his occasional remarks on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons suggest a definitive shift. Although Trump’s overall attitude towards India has been positive, it’s his larger worldview that will have a great bearing on India’s strategic choices."

I think this is a point that not just New Delhi needs to keep in mind but most of US allies -- and US adversaries.  Even if Trump does not win the Presidency -- this is by no means certain, as some Democrats like the political commentator Van Jones is trying desperately to tell their party -- he is quite likely to move the entire conversation to the Left on critical issues such as (as Raja Mohan pointed out, correctly) on trade, but also on US commitment to its allies because, as Trump has pointed out, US allies don't pay their fair share of the burden of the common defense.  This is an old issue within US alliances, but what Trump forgets is that old Spiderman quote: with great power comes great responsibility. Or may be it is greater responsibility.  Still, Trump's focus is likely shift domestic argument, and Hillary Clinton -- assuming she is the Democratic nominee -- is also likely to agree that burden-sharing needs to be revisited.  This should be serious worry for all US allies -- and for countries like India which, though not a formal US ally, depends on the US to help balance China in Asia.  Much of the discussion of unipolarity and the post cold war international system has focused on calculations of material power to assess polarity.  But they have rarely considered the willingness of the US to carry the burden of managing and maintaining global order.  And Defensive Realists, who have repeatedly called for the US to reduce its global footprint with an off-shore balancing strategy, do not consider the consequences of such a posture for regional stability and its consequent impact on global order.  If Trump wins in November, and if he carries through with his promise, India and other Asian powers will find that the biggest problem will be to convince the US that it has to play a role as a balancer in Asia.  This raises unpalatable choices for India and other Asian states -- either acquiesce in a China-dominated Asia or expend a lot more effort in trying to balance China.  It might become difficult to find a hedge to perch on then. 

US and India: Moving Towards A Transactional Relationship

A brief essay, published in Economic Times (Januaty 26, 2015) on the Obama visit to India and US-India strategic ties, which I am posting rather late.  My original title is the post title, but the ET title is given below.

Obama in India: Both Countries Should Focus on Areas of Mutual Interest

Barack Obama is the first US president to visit India twice and the first to be chief guest at the Republic Day parade. Thus, the hyperbole that normally accompanies such state visits being a notch higher this time, as was evident in PM Narendra Modi’s and Obama’s joint media address on Sunday.

Being democracies, both India and the US would prefer to base their foreign policies on something larger and nobler than narrow self-interest. And Modi’s developmental agenda means that American investment and smart cities may garner a lot of attention. But without strategic understanding, economic ties themselves will suffer.

After Modi's US Visit

My assessment about the state of the US-India relationship has been put out by the East West Centre through its Asia-Pacific Bulletin series.  I argued that while there are some significant advances, the relationship also faces some problems, especially as a consequence of Obama's disinterest in the region, India repeatedly disappointing its friends in Washington, and New Delhi's continuing foolishness over the nuclear liability bill.  The essay is reproduced below.

US-India Relations after the Modi Visit

A decade back, US-India relations appeared finally to be ready to break from the traditional pattern of swinging between euphoria and exasperation.  But over the last several years, that pattern re-emerged as both Washington and New Delhi busily dug their relationship into a hole.  One state visit, even such a high-octane one as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s, cannot be expected to pull the two sides out of this hole, but it would be fair to say that the two sides have at least stopped digging.  But there is hard work ahead and the outcome is by no means certain. 

There is enough blame to go around for the state of the relationship, though New Delhi has to take a bigger share.  Immediately after the US-India nuclear deal was concluded, the UPA government under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was in a hurry to distance itself from the US, frightened about the domestic political consequence of its closeness to Washington.  What followed was India’s Nuclear Liability Bill (which essentially negated the key benefits of the US-India nuclear deal), its decision to reject American combat jets for the Indian Air Force, its abstention from the Libya vote in the UN Security Council, and a downgrading of military ties.  On the US side, President Obama started out as other Democratic presidents have, wanting a special relationship with China and seeking to push a Kashmir negotiation between India and Pakistan, both key red flags for India.  More fundamentally, Obama’s apparent desire to pull back from America’s global commitments led to concerns in Asia and in India about Washington’s dependability just as China was asserting itself in Asia – concerns that have yet to subside despite Obama’s Asia ‘pivot’ and ‘rebalancing’. 

Superb Essay on Obama, Bush and US National Security Decision-Making

President Obama's foolish foreign policy choices are finally coming home to roost.  The old saying about a stitch in time saving nine applies very well here: if Obama had provided better levels of support to more moderate Syrian rebels, the Islamic State terrorist might never have become the kind of threat it has in the region, which now requires much harder responses.  There is a lesson in here for Obama's larger foreign policy strategy of disengagement, which is that such disengagement can create conditions that are a lot more dangerous than engagement.  This is not to suggest that levels of engagement should not be carefully thought out, and disengagement might be appropriate under some circumstances, but that disengagement cannot be a doctrine -- especially for the world's most powerful state.

David Rothkopf, editor of the Foreign Policy group, has excellent essay on the decision-making styles of the Bush and Obama White House, which provides a very nuanced picture of the process in both White Houses and which, incidentally, is more objective in examining the Bush foreign policy especially in the second term.

The Strategic Consequences of Russi-Chini Bhai Bhai

The continuing tragedy of the MH-17 shoot-down shows no sign of abating.  But there are deeper strategic consequences too of pushing Russia too hard, forcing it into Beijing's hands.  The point has been made before: Dr. C. Raja Mohan had an essay in the Indian Express in the context of Prime Minister Modi at the BRICS summit.  In a slightly different context in the National Interest, Dimitry K. Simes made a similar point but castigating President Obama's policies.

I wrote in the Economic Times that this might have direct consequences for India.  The essay is reproduced in full below

Sino-Russian Bonhomie Brewing; India Should Be Wary

The tragic shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine is likely to lead to further American pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin. The increasing US-Russia antagonism will have consequences and they will undoubtedly impact India.

There is enough blame to go around for the slow escalation of the Ukraine crisis. Putin's attempt to control Russia's so-called "near abroad" and prevent the expansion of Western influence towards the Russian border has been one element. This is an objective that Russia has pushed with little finesse. The reckless support for the rebels in eastern Ukraine, including the supply of heavy arms and equipment and Russian military forces, was no doubt the immediate cause of the tragic shooting down of the Malaysian airliner (even if it was unintended).

The Iran Nuke Deal

The nuclear deal between Iran and the P-5+1 have obviously received a lot of attention.  The general opinion in India and Asia appears to be favourable to the deal, as the Regional Powers Initiative (RPI) noted.  I am less impressed and I think this has potentially dangerous longer term consequences.  My take was published in Economic Times and is reproduced below.

Iran Nuclear Deal: Short-Term Benefits and Long-Term Consequences

US President Barack Obama has won a much-needed foreign political victory by sealing a temporary nuclear deal with Iran. But while there are some short-term benefits, the long term consequences of this deal are much more hazy and potentially quite dangerous. Equally worrying should be the consequences of the deal for nuclear weapon spreading in the Middle East and the larger political effects on America's friends and allies, especially in the region and in Asia.

The US and the Great Game

President Obama's decision to cancel his Asia trip has generated a lot of commentary about how the US is losing Asia to China (if you don't believe me, just take a look at Real Clear World for the last few days).  My take is that the key problem in Washington is one of willingness to play the 'Great Game' rather than any lack of capabilities.  And it is not as if the US is not doing anything: they just concluded an expanded military treaty with Japan.  But Obama seems to think that this is all a bit silly and somewhat old fashioned.  Reminds me of all the nonsense that PM Nehru spouted about the balance of power until, of course, it snapped around and took a big bite in October 1962.  Not that not playing the game is winning Obama any friends: the Hindu (and others of that ilk) will continue to whine about US policy irrespective of what the US does precisely because it is the US.  My take on the issue was published in Economic Times yesterday (Oct. 8, 2013) and reproduced in full below.

Twin Summits: Bali minus Barack Obama is just right for China as US tend to lose

By Rajesh Rajagopalan

Doubts about US willingness to play the great game in Asia have been around for at least a decade. With Barack Obama, these doubts have been growing. His decision to cancel his Asia tour because of the US government shutdown means that he will miss two crucial summits: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) summit as well as the East Asia Summit. And it has let loose a storm of commentary about Washing-ton's loss and China's gain because Xi Jinping, China's new leader, has been talking partnership and winning friends even among traditional sceptics about China such as Indonesia.

IDSA Discussion on India's Iran Options

I participated in a roundtable at IDSA on Iran's nuclear imbroglio and India's options along with a bunch of foreign office heavy-weights, which included five former Ambassadors, including the Chair Amb. Arundhati Ghose.  This seemed like a good time to discuss the issue since Rowhani is just about to take over in Iran and there are murmurs of movement on Iran's negotiations with the P5+1 about the nuclear issue.

We discussed various possible scenarios and what India's options were under different scenarios (status quo, a mutually acceptable solution, or Iran becoming a nuclear power).  Of these scenarios, I felt that the status quo was not really stable because it was constantly changing.  As Iran's enriched uranium stockpiles increase, something will have to give.  Moreover, both Iran's stockpile as well as Iran's capacity to increase the stockpile (new centrifuges as well as the number of centrifuges) was increasing with each passing month.  Iran has been careful to maintain its quantity of 20% enriched uranium below the Israeli redline of 240 kgs but it is quite close.  Iran appears to have deliberately taken steps to not cross that line, down-blending some additional 20% enriched fuel and converting some.  (Iran actually produced more than 300 kgs overall).  The six tons or so of 5% enriched uranium is probably sufficient for about two bombs, I think, assuming it is enriched further.  But that 5% stockpile is growing too, quite rapidly, as the May 2013 IAEA report makes clear.  So I sam not sure there is any such as a status quo currently.

More on 'Soft Alliances'

In my latest essay in EconomicTimes (see also my previous post), I argued that the US and India need to develop a ‘soft alliance’ in order to have a steady relationship that is not bogged down every time there is an election campaign in either country or whenever political attention flags and the bureaucrats take over.  Since I could not define the concept in an opinion piece, I am outlining my view of the concept here.  By ‘soft alliance’, I mean a partnership short of a formal military alliance but one of long-term strategic empathy in which the partners act to support each other other militarily, diplomatically and politically, both in direct confrontations with other states as well as in other circumstances. 

There are a number of examples of such soft alliances.  Because most people in Delhi would be most familiar with it, I cited the Indo-Soviet/Russian partnership as an example.  Going back to the early 1960s, and continuing in a thinner form even today, Moscow and New Delhi have supported each other almost instinctively.  And they supported each other even when they disagreed with each other, keeping their disagreements to their private dialogue rather than outlining it in public.  For example, the Soviet Union was embarrassed about having to repeatedly cast vetoes on behalf of India during the 1971 India-Pakistan war because much of the rest of the world wanted a ceasefire, but they did it.  Similarly, the Soviets were strong supporters of nuclear non-proliferation but they muted their criticism (at least in public) when it came to India’s refusal to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  India returned the favour, repeatedly supporting Moscow on issues such as its invasion of Afghanistan even while New Delhi expressed its displeasure privately.  We did have a ‘Friendship Treaty’, of course, but most of the support they gave each other was almost instinctive rather than contractual, which is what I mean by strategic empathy.  And this relationship remains one of India’s most valuable even today, though Russia’s dalliance with Beijing (being driven by foolish American policies – but more on this later) might unfortunately end this in the coming decade. 

My essay on an India-US soft alliance

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden is on a visit to India, and the state of U.S. India relations is again being debated.  C. Raja Mohan has a typically insightful essay in Indian Express which he outlines five guidelines to make the relationship robust and enduring.  Ashley Tellis argues that it is not such a bad thing if the relationship has reached a plateau if it means stability and predictability.  Kanwal Sibal, India's former foreign secretary, wrote last week in the Hindu that despite some convergences, there are still "significant divergences emanating from huge disparity in power, different priorities, conflicting regional interests and differing views on structures of global governance."

My own take was published in the Economic Times today.  I argue that India and the US should aim to create a relationship similar to what India and Soviet Union had during the cold war, which I characterize as a 'soft alliance'.  I will shortly post another essay on what I mean by the concept, which, for obvious reason could not be included in the ET essay.  Below I have posted my essay as it appeared today.  

Why India-US should look at developing a soft alliance

Rajesh Rajagopalan

If high-level visits were a positive indicator of the state of bilateral ties, India-US relations would be in fine shape.

American Vice-President Joe Biden arrives in India on Monday and it comes barely a month after Secretary of State John Kerry came for the India-US Strategic Dialogue. Last week Finance Minister P Chidambaram was in Washington, and in September Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will travel there. Moreover, both sides have set an ambitious agenda for themselves, including untangling the nuclear commercial issues by the time the prime minister goes to Washington.

Perspectives on the Kerry Visit and US-India Ties

Secretary of State John Kerry's visit has led to a good number of assessments of the state of US-India ties.  Now that I have posted my views (rather, my essay in the Economic Times), its time to post some of the other perspectives.  Several analysts who are sympathetic to improved US-India ties acknowledge that the relationship is not where it should be.  C. Raja Mohan calls on the Prime Minister to do what he did in his first term, to rely on his own judgement, in order to improve the ties:

". . . sections of the Indian establishment have deliberately sought to create some political distance between Delhi and Washington and sell discredited ideas from the Cold War past as great strategic insights. Singh nearly bought the crazy proposition that a bird in the hand was worth a lot less than two in the bush. The belief in Delhi that going slow with America might convince China to offer India a boundary deal now stands discredited, thanks to the Chinese military intrusion into Ladakh during April-May.Singh must rely on common sense rather than the overly clever theories that have derailed India's diplomacy in the second tenure of the UPA."

India and the US Must Return to What is Truly 'Strategic' in their Ties

US Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in India for the US-India Strategic Dialogue.  US-India relationship is going through one of those periods of drift and lethargy.  My take on the relations was published in the Economic Times and reproduced below.  

India-US must revisit what is truly strategic in their ties

By Rajesh Rajagopalan

Whatever adjectives are being used to describe the state of India-US ties — as Secretary of State John Kerry comes visiting —it is clear that the relationship is not where it should be or where it was expected to be. New Delhi has to share a significant part of the blame because in the years after the India-US nuclear deal, it has seemed much more uncertain about what it wants from the relationship and much more sceptical about its benefits.

These opinions are now being echoed in Washington. As the US withdraws from Afghanistan next year and the national election campaign kicks off in India, the prospects for any immediate improvement are dimming. It is time both sides returned to what is truly strategic in their relationship.

Snowden's Run

Edward Snowden continues to run from US authorities, and is now presumably cooling his heels at the transit lounge of Sheremetyevo airport in Moscow.  His flight path, according to news reports, takes him from China-controlled Hong Kong to Moscow and then towards Cuba and finally either Ecuador or Venezuela.  I am not sure why North Korea was off this list since it seems to match all of the key requirement that Snowden and his Wikileaks supporters seem to want: unlimited personal freedom, fast internet and limited government.

My take on the Snowden affair was published by Economic Times last week.  Took me some time to put it up . . . .

On the Iranian elections

There has been a good deal of commentary on the recent Iran elections.  My take, published in The Economic Times on June 12, is that this election will not be consequential irrespective of who wins.  The piece was published before the elections but though Hassan Rouhani -- the most moderate and prudent candidate in this limited field -- won convincingly, I would still stand by my original analysis.  Indeed, he might be even more of a challenge than Ahmadinejad both because he is and perceived as more moderate (but who is unlikely to give up Iran's nuclear weapons program) and because he is quite crafty.  Dr. Raja Mohan has a somewhat similar take in the Indian Express, obviously presented much better.  

The inconsequential election of Iran could only spell further doom

By Rajesh Rajagopalan

The results of the Iranian presidential elections this Friday should be important because Iran is central to the stability in the region. Unfortunately, the heavily controlled election, in which religious leaders have barred any candidate who would present an alternative path, means that irrespective of who wins, there is unlikely to be a major change in Iran's policies. 

Sixth India Trilateral Forum, Stockholm

Jyoti Malhotra, Abraham Denmark, Dan Twining, me and Francois Godement at the 6th India Trilateral Forum, Stockholm

I attended the 6^th India Trilateral Forum in Stockholm recently (April 12-13, 2013).  The India Trilateral Forum’s are organized by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, with support from the Swedish, US and Indian governments.  I had attended the previous two meetings too and it is the only meeting that brings together such a diverse group: scholars, practitioners and some business people.  Since most of the academic meetings I attend include only the first category (and a sprinkling of retired members of the second group), this was an interesting change.  In previous meetings, I found business leaders more optimistic and somewhat less cynical than academics, and it was no different this time. 

More Bad News from Afghanistan

I had written sometime back about the bad news coming out of Afghanistan.  My expectation is that Karzai and the Afghan National Army (ANA) would not fare well after the international forces pull out of Afghanistan.  Now comes a story in the New York Times that Taliban attacks are increasing and that the ANA is bearing the brunt of the attacks as the international forces increasingly leave their combat role.  It is not clear how the ANA is doing in these attacks, but the limited data in the story does not sound good.      More ANA soldiers seem to have died last year than the year before.

India, Russia and maybe even the US and Iran need to focus on rebuilding some opposing forces that can counter the Taliban when -- not if -- they take over.  The nucleus of a new Northern Alliance can be parts or elements of the current ANA, but unless this is done before the international forces withdraw, it will be quite difficult to do much.  But the political paralysis in all these capitals on the issue is a huge stumbling block.  The attitude appears to be to hope for the best and prepare for nothing.

On Reinhold Niebuhr

Will Inboden has a nice blog entry over at Shadow Government on Reinhold Niebuhr, the American Realist, a summary of the points he made at the recent International Studies Association convention.  I have not read enough of Neibuhr to make a critique of Inboden's points but I was curious about his final point about Neibuhr's opposition to pragmatism.  I had always identified Realism with pragmatism and as a key Realist, I would have assumed that this was a value that Neibuhr supported.  The essential point is that I need to read more Niebuhr to fully understand the relationship.

I would also particularly recommend one of the links in Inboden's essay to an essay by Paul Elie in the Atlantic a few years back on the Niebuhr.